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Abstract
Securitization makes mortgage-related risks internationally tradeable and
thus contributes considerably to the international diversification of macroe-
conomic risk: in the years 2003-2008, the increase in international cross
holdings of securitized mortgage debt has lowered industrialized countries’
conditional consumption volatility (relative to the United States) by about
10-15 percentage points. We turn to the role of domestic credit in explaining
this result. Domestic credit leads to better international risk sharing only if
debt is securitized and traded internationally. Conversely, the risk-sharing
benefits from securitization seem to evaporate if credit dries up – as it did
in the recent financial crisis.
KEYWORDS: FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION, INTERNATIONAL RISK SHARING,
HOME BIAS, SECURITIZATION, MORTGAGE MARKETS, ASSET PRICES, INTERNA-
TIONAL BUSINESS CYCLES
JEL CLASSIFICATION: F 36, F 41, G15, G21
1 Introduction
The securitization of mortgage-related debt has played a major role in
the emergence and proliferation of the current financial crisis (see Brunner-
meier (2009) for a detailed account). Understandably, this has led to wide-
spread skepticism with respect to the usefulness of such instruments for an
efficient allocation of macroeconomic risk. From the current experience it
seems obvious that the repackaging of mortgage debt in mortgage-backed
securities (MBS) can have enormous aggregate costs,1 but to date no empir-
ical account of the potential macroeconomic benefits of these instruments
exists.
In this paper we contribute to filling this gap by exploring the impact that
the increasing use of mortgage securitization has had on the international
diversification of macroeconomic risk. From a theoretical point of view, one
may expect that the impact of mortgage securitization could be large. Mort-
gage markets are internationally far less integrated than say equity or bond
markets. Residential real estate is largely domestically financed in most
economies, making fluctuations in the value of housing and the quality of
mortgage debt a major background risk from the perspective of an indi-
vidual country. Securitization can help diversify such risks internationally
because it makes mortgage-debt internationally tradeable.
Indeed, we find that the increase in international cross holdings of se-
curitized mortgage debt from 2003 to 2008 has lowered the sensitivity of
consumption to a country-specific one percent growth shock by about 10-15
percentage points. In examining the quantitative impact of securitization
on international consumption risk sharing, we also attempt to shed light on
some key elements of the mechanism through which risk is shared. There
1
is by now a large literature emphasizing the role of increased international
asset holdings for improvements in international risk sharing. It would at
first seem that increased securitization is just another instance of this glob-
alization in international asset positions. We argue it is more: the growth in
securitized debt issuance in the last decade was driven largely by mortgage
debt and as we have argued, mortgage debt is issued largely by domestic
banks to domestic households. While increased domestic lending can pro-
vide better risk sharing between banks and households within a country, it
is not clear a priori why purely domestic credit growth should contribute to
better consumption risk sharing between countries. We show that the effect
of domestic credit on international risk sharing depends on the extent of
securitization. Taken by itself, we find no effect of domestic credit on inter-
national risk sharing but the effect is very strong, once credit is interacted
with securitization. Our interpretation of these findings is that securitiza-
tion increases the international risk sharing benefits from domestic credit
by dispersing domestic credit risk internationally.2 This is our main result,
which is also robust to controlling for the simultaneous growth in direct
international cross-holdings of other financial assets.
If securitization carries benefits in terms of better international risk shar-
ing, this inevitably raises the question whether the costs inflicted by a major
downturn such as the subprime crisis could not still outweigh the potential
welfare benefits of better international risk sharing by an order of magni-
tude. Securitization may well facilitate risk sharing in tranquil times, but
it might actually make things worse in a crisis. Our results also shed some
light on this issue: because the interaction between domestic credit and se-
curitization matters for international risk sharing, there will be less or even
no risk sharing benefits from securitization once credit declines sharply as it
2
did in the recent financial crisis. Indeed, our estimates suggest a huge drop
in international risk sharing during 2007/08.
Finally, in interpreting our results, it is important to bear in mind that
the bulk of the international trade in mortgage backed securities before the
recent financial crisis was unidirectional, with the United States predomi-
nantly selling and the rest of the industrialized world buying these assets –
a stylized fact that we document in detail in the remainder of the paper. Our
findings therefore could also be read as implying that industrialized coun-
tries’ consumption fluctuations have become more aligned with US shocks in
the run-up to the subprime crisis. While perfectly consistent with improved
risk sharing, this could mean that the risk sharing benefits may largely have
been reaped by the US itself, which may thus have been able to offload to
other countries a significant fraction of the risk associated with its domes-
tic mortgage debt. Specifically, the reduced-form evidence in this paper is
consistent with the possibility that this international trade in MBS may have
contributed to ’exporting’ what had started as a domestic US financial crisis.
While we explicitly acknowledge these points, we also note that the global
spread of the crisis is not in itself evidence against potential risk sharing
benefits from trade in mortgage-backed securities: we just do not know the
counterfactual, i.e. how much worse the crisis for the US could possibly
have been if some of the burden had not been shared by other countries
through the international trade in these securities.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we present our
empirical framework. Section three presents our data set. Section four
presents the bulk of our empirical results. Section five summarizes and
concludes.
3
2 International Risk Sharing and the securitization
of mortgage debt
We measure consumption risk sharing through panel regressions of the
form
∆ log
Ckt
C∗t
= βU
[
∆ log
GDP kt
GDP ∗t
]
+ εkt (1)
where Ckt is per capita consumption in country k in period t, GDP
k
t is the
country’s output per head and the asterisk denotes the international per
capita average of the respective variable.
Regressions such as (1) have been widely used in empirical macroe-
conomics as a way to measure the incompleteness of financial markets.3
Specifically, we can think of the estimate of βU as measuring the amount of
uninsured idiosyncratic output risk. At an empirical level, this interpretation
is based on the stylized fact that, in panel data, βU is regularly between 0
and unity. Thus, 1 − βU can straightforwardly be associated with the share
of the average country’s idiosyncratic business cycle risk that gets shared via
financial markets, whereas βU is the fraction of non-diversified idiosyncratic
risk faced by the average country in the panel.
Early estimates of βU based on international data typically were in the
range between 0.7 and 0.8. Estimates based on more recent data are often
found to be considerably lower, reflecting the effect of financial globaliza-
tion on international risk sharing (see Sørensen et al. (2007), Artis and
Hoffmann (2006)).
In this paper, we wish to explore to what extent βU varies across coun-
tries depending on the degree to which mortgage-related debt is securitized
and traded internationally. Our basic tool will be panel regressions in which
4
we parametrize the coefficient βU as a linear function of securitization and
of other country- and time-varying controls, so that
βkU (t) = β0 + z
k′
t βz (2)
where zkt is a vector containing time-varying and country-specific charac-
teristics. We partition zkt into aggregate, x
′
t, and (time-invariant) country-
specific characteristics, vk. In addition, we also allow for some character-
istics to vary by country and time, y′kt , so that zk′t =
[
x′t,vk′,yk′t
]
. The
equation we estimate is of the form
∆c˜kt = β0∆g˜dp
k
t + z
k′
t βz∆g˜dp
k
t + y
k′
t γ + α+ δ
k + τt + ε
k
t . (3)
Here, and in the remainder of the paper, we use lower-case letters to de-
note logarithms and the tilde to denote idiosyncratic variables, so that, e.g.,
∆˜c
k
t = ∆ log
[
Ckt /C
∗
t
]
. The first two terms come from plugging the defini-
tion (2) into the basic risk sharing regression (1). Our estimation equation
also includes country-fixed effects (δk) to allow for long-term cross-country
differences in consumption growth rates that may be unrelated to imperfect
risk sharing and a common time effect (τt) to allow for any additional cross-
sectional dependence that may not be controlled by our use of idiosyncratic
growth rates. To avoid spurious estimates of the coefficient vector βz on
the interaction terms, we would generally also need to include first-order
terms of zk′t . Note that in the particular specification this will not be neces-
sary for all components of zkt . The reason for this is that the time-variation
in aggregate variables will be captured through the panel time-specific ef-
fects. Equally, as long as the country-specific characteristics are assumed to
be time-invariant, these will be fully captured by the country fixed-effects.
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Hence, the specification above will include the first-order terms only for
those components of zkt , the characteristics y
k
t , that vary across countries
and time (such as e.g. our indicator of securitization).4
In our final specification, the vector zkt will include a measure for mort-
gage securitization, a measure of lending and the interaction between the
two, as well as a number of controls, such as international asset positions so
that
βkU (t) = β0+β1SEC
k
t +β2
[
Credit
GDP
]k
t
+β3SEC
k
t ×
[
Credit
GDP
]k
t
+controls′βctrl
We use two quantitative measures that we denote with SECX,kt where the
X is a stand-in for the specific measure. In the next section, we describe in
detail how the two measures are constructed.
3 Data
3.1 Measuring the Securitization of Mortgage Debt
Quantitative data on the actual extent to which mortgage debt is securi-
tized is not available for many countries. One exception is the US, for which
data on international cross-holdings of asset-backed securities (ABS) are
available on an annual basis from 2003 to 2008 from the Report on Foreign
Portfolio Holdings of U.S. Securities and the respective issues of the Report
on U.S. Portfolio Holdings of Foreign Securities by the US Department of the
Treasury Office of International Affairs. These data are part of the Treasury
International Capital (TIC) system and we refer to them as TIC data.5
Based on these data, we calculate gross and net country ABS holdings.
Our measure of gross holdings is
6
SECGAB,kt =
ABSk,USt +ABS
US,k
t
GDP kt +GDP
US
t
where ABSk,US denotes country k holdings of US-collateralized ABS and
ABSUS,k the respective holdings of the US in country k and the acronym
GAB stands for ’Gross Asset-Backed’ securities. This first quantitative mea-
sure focuses on (cumulated) bilateral trade in asset backed securities. We
normalize with the joint GDP of both countries to control for size differ-
ences, which is analogous to the bilateral openness measure commonly used
in the trade literature. The second measure is constructed in the same way,
except that now we focus on the net position of country k with the US:
SECNAB,kt =
ABSk,USt −ABSUS,kt
GDP kt +GDP
US
t
where NAB stands for ’Net Asset-Backed’ securities. Ideally, we would like
to have gross and net positions for each country against the rest-of-the-
world. Such data are, however, not available and any attempt to calculate
them would require very strong assumptions. The measures here effectively
treat the United States as rest-of-the-world. This assumption is not overly
restrictive, though: in our sample of countries, the US accounted for almost
90 percent of the value of outstanding ABS in 2003 and still for more than
three quarters in 2008.6
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Table 1 provides some descriptives for the TIC data set. Panel A re-
ports numbers relative to home country GDP, Panel B as a share of joint
(US+home) GDP at current exchange rates. Both panels give largely the
same message: first, it is apparent that international positions in ABS have
7
increased considerably between 2003 and 2008, both in gross and net terms.
Average gross positions with the US have more than doubled from 1.65 per-
cent of home GDP to 3.33. The increase is in the same order of magnitude
when measured relative to joint GDP, with cross-holdings virtually doubling
from 0.12 percent of joint GDP to 0.26. There is a lot of variation across
countries, though. Whereas in both 2003 and 2008, some countries had
virtually no cross-holdings in ABS with the US, for other countries these po-
sitions amount to more than 10 percent of home GDP (or 0.8 of joint GDP).
The table also shows that most international trade in mortgage-backed secu-
rities is one-way – from the US to other countries: average net positions are
not much smaller than gross positions reflecting the fact that most countries
have high average MBS assets in the United States but virtually no liabilities
vis-a`-vis that country.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 1 presents the cross-sectional average of the gross positions over
time. We see a very steep increase in ABS holdings until 2007 and a pro-
nounced fall in these holdings in 2008, the latter clearly the effect of the
subprime crisis. A very similar trend is discernible from the net ABS posi-
tions (not shown), which again reflects the fact that the United States are a
big net issuer of securitized debt, so that international gross positions, to a
large extent, reflect the negative US net position in these assets. 7
3.2 Country sample, output and consumption data
Our sample comprises the following 14 countries: Australia, Belgium,
8
Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States. We obtain
annual, real consumption p.c. and real GDP p.c. from the IMF’s Financial
Statistics. Consumption and GDP are deflated with the respective countries’
CPI and population figures.
4 Results
4.1 Baseline results
Table 2 displays our first results. In column I we present the results form
the baseline regression
∆c˜kt = β0∆g˜dp
k
t + β1SEC
X,k
t ×∆g˜dp
k
t + γ1SEC
X,k
t + α+ δ
k + τt + ε
k
t (4)
Robust t-statistics appear below the estimates in parentheses.8 Panel A is for
the gross measure, SECGAB, Panel B for the net measure SECNAB.9
The coefficient on SEC is significant at the 5%-level for both measures.
The effect is also economically important: the coefficients on SECGAB and
SECNAB are normalized to reflect a typical (ten basis point) change in
these variables (which are expressed as gross or net holdings relative to joint
GDP).10 Hence, an estimate of β1 of around −0.1 implies that a one basis
point increase in SECGAB or SECNAB is associated with an almost one
percentage point improvement in risk sharing. As is apparent from Table 1,
over the period 2003-08, SECGAB for the average country has increased
by 14 basis points, from 0.12 to 0.26 percent of joint GDP, implying that
cross-holdings of securitized assets should have contributed to an average
increase in bilateral risk sharing with the US (decrease in βkU (t)) of around
9
14 percentage points.
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Columns II and III provide a set of general robustness checks: in column
II, we include time fixed effects in the interaction with ∆g˜dp to control for
any trend that is common across countries and that might be correlated with
securitization. In column III, we remove the country-specific mean from
our securitization measure to control for unobservable or omitted (time-
invariant) country-characteristics in the interaction term with ∆g˜dp
k
t . Both
of these changes in specification leave our estimated coefficients quite stable
and significantly negative.11
These are our baseline results: securitization of mortgage debt seems
associated with better risk sharing at the international level. That raises the
question ’why?’. We argue that securitization allows the better diversifica-
tion of domestic credit risk, notably of the risk associated with mortgage
debt. This implies that securitization should impact international risk shar-
ing through its impact on domestic lending. We explore this possibility next.
Before doing so, however, we show that securitization is not just another
form of financial globalization and we present some robustness checks.
4.2 Securitization and international financial integration
Securitization of mortgage related debt seems to improve international
risk sharing, which suggests that it is an important aspect of financial glob-
alization. However, securitization could just be another facet of the sec-
ular growth in international gross asset holdings that we have seen since
the early/mid 1990s (see Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003, 2007)). Sørensen
10
et al. (2007) and Artis and Hoffmann (2006) document that the increase in
cross-border asset holdings is echoed in improved international consump-
tion risk sharing. Since the increase in gross foreign asset holdings world-
wide coincides with the period at which securitization has been introduced
in various countries in our sample, our securitization indicator could just
pick up this trend in financial globalization. Not so: we parametrize risk
sharing as a function of a (country-specific) financial globalization trend
βkU (t) = β0 + β1SEC
X,k
t + β2gfa
k
t (5)
where t denotes a time trend and gfakt =
(FAkt+FL
k
t )
GDPkt
the average gross
foreign asset positions of country k relative to its GDP with FAkt (FL
k
t )
denoting foreign assets (liabilities) of country k at time t. Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2003, 2007) propose gfakt as a measure of the trend in financial
integration. We use their updated data set here which stretches till the end
of 2007. For the last year of our sample, 2008, we extrapolate gfakt using
a fourth-order polynomial in t that we previously fitted to each country’s
asset position for the period up to 2007. Table 3 summarizes the results:
the coefficient on SECX,kt remains stable and significant in both the net
and gross specifications: securitization improves international risk sharing
even if we control for the country-specific trend induced by international
cross-holdings of other financial assets.
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
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4.3 The channel: international trade in securitized debt and do-
mestic lending
The exact mechanisms through which securitization may impact on in-
ternational consumption patterns are likely to be complex and sensitive to
the institutional framework in each individual country. It is beyond the
scope of this paper to offer a theoretical model that discusses these is-
sues. However, our results show that the degree to which securitized debt
is traded across national boundaries has a strong bearing on international
risk sharing. We now turn to what we believe to be the direct consequences
of the increased tradeability of mortgage debt for bank lending behavior:
by selling mortgage debt, banks can reduce their exposure to local busi-
ness cycle and housing market conditions. This puts them into a position
to keep on lending even in recessions and when credit market conditions
are tight, thus allowing households to effectively share consumption risk
through increased borrowing. The empirical relevance of this transmission
mechanism for the United States has been demonstrated by Loutskina and
Strahan (2009) who show that securitization increased bank lending which
may in turn have been beneficial to risk sharing. Here, we examine whether
the interaction between domestic credit and international trade in securi-
tized assets can help explain why securitization increases consumption risk
sharing between countries.
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
In the first panel of Table 4, we specify international risk sharing as a
12
function of domestic credit
βkU (t) = β0 + β1
[
credit
GDP
]k
t
The coefficient is insignificant and positive, suggesting that domestic credit
alone may not necessarily improve risk sharing. The next panel of Table
4 reports the results of a horse race between credit and our securitization
indicators, i.e. a specification of the form
βkU (t) = β0 + β1
[
credit
GDP
]k
t
+ β2SEC
X,k
t
where, again, X = GAB,NAB in turn. The coefficient on securitization
is negative in all cases and significant, whereas the coefficient on credit
remains positive. Hence, more domestic credit per se is not generally asso-
ciated with better international consumption risk sharing, whereas interna-
tional cross-holdings of securitized domestic debt are. Our interpretation of
these findings is that domestic lending may not necessarily lead to better in-
ternational risk sharing unless a part of this domestic credit risk is eventually
sold internationally. Securitization should make domestic debt (in particular
mortgages) more easily tradeable across national borders, thus translating
increased domestic lending into better risk sharing between countries.12
This interpretation is supported by the results of a specification for βU (t)
in which we include an interaction term between domestic credit and secu-
ritization:
βkU (t) = β0 + β1
[
credit
GDP
]k
t
+ β2SEC
k
t + β3 ×
[
credit
GDP
]k
t
× SECX,kt + β4t
Results are in the last rows of each panel in Table 4. The coefficient on the
13
interaction between credit and securitization is negative and significant for
both the gross and the net measures. This suggests that securitization has a
stronger effect on international risk sharing when credit is abundant. Credit
alone, however, does not appear to impact on international risk sharing. 13
4.4 Robustness
We briefly summarize a number of robustness checks that we conducted
and of which detailed results are available in a Technical Appendix on the
web:14 first, we checked whether our results are driven by outliers. To
this end, we parametrized the baseline regressions in Table 1 in terms of
log(1 + SECX,kt ) instead of SEC
X,k
t . This somewhat lowered the statisti-
cal significance of our results but did not affect their overall flavour: there
is an economically significant link between securitization and risk sharing.
Second, we normalized international gross and net holdings of securitzed
assets with country GDP rather than the sum of US and country GDP. Again,
this does not change the basic result. 15
As a last exercise we checked whether the importance of the interaction
between credit and securitization is driven by cyclical variation in credit or
by country-specific (but time invariant) differences in the ratio of credit to
GDP. To this end, we used the country-specific sample means of credit/GDP
in the regressions in Table 4. We find that these country-specific differences
are important, but that there also seems to be a a role for the cylical compo-
nent in credit. We turn to this point in more detail in the next subsection.
14
4.5 Securitization and international risk sharing in the recent
financial crisis
Our finding that the interaction between domestic credit and international
trade in securitized assets is important for international risk sharing has
interesting implications for the role of securitization during the recent fi-
nancial crisis. Specifically, if credit declines sharply – as it did during the
recent crisis – the results in Table 4 might lead us to expect that the impact
of securitization on international risk sharing should have declined.
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
To capture such time variation in international risk sharing, we run a
sequence of cross-sectional regressions for the years t = 2005...2008:16
∆c˜kt = β0(t)∆g˜dp
k
t + β1(t) × SECGAB,kt−1 ×∆g˜dp
k
t + τt + ε
k
t
Figure 2 plots the sequence of coefficients β1(t) on the interaction between
securitization and idiosyncratic GDP growth. The coefficient becomes more
and more negative in the years before 2008, signaling an increasing contri-
bution of securitization to risk sharing. In the crisis year 2008, however, it
actually becomes positive (though it is very close to zero). Note that each
of the cross-sectional estimates of β1(t) for t = 2005..2008 is derived from
very few observations. The asymptotic standard error bands provided in the
figure – which are already relatively wide – therefore most likely underesti-
mate the true uncertainty surrounding these estimates. We therefore think
of figure 2 as a first look at this issue. This first look, however, is broadly
consistent with our conjecture: securitization has had a procyclical effect on
15
international risk sharing – while it tended to improve risk sharing in the
boom years, this positive effect practically vanished in the crisis.
5 Conclusions
We find that international cross-holdings of securitized debt is associated
with better international consumption risk sharing. The effect is large: in
the years before the recent financial crisis, the increase in international cross
holdings of securitized mortgage debt has lowered relative consumption
growth volatility (conditional on a country’s typical output growth shock
vis-a`-vis the United States) by about 10-15 percentage points. We find that
this result is robust to a range of controls for other aspects of financial glob-
alization.
What can explain this large effect? We argue that it is the interaction
between the availability of domestic credit and securitization. While higher
domestic credit is not unconditionally very strongly correlated with more in-
ternational risk sharing, we find that it is among countries with higher inter-
national positions in securitized debt. This suggests that securitization helps
spread the risks associated with domestic credit growth internationally. This
seems true in particular in the one segment of the credit market that was
previously the most internationally segmented: mortgages. Conversely, our
results also suggest that the risk sharing benefits of securitization are likely
to be contingent on the availability of domestic credit: we find no risk shar-
ing benefits from securitization during the subprime crisis, when the stock
of outstanding domestic credit fell dramatically.
16
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Notes
1See Keys et al. (2009) and Mian and Sufi (2009) for detailed empirical accounts of how
the originate-to-distribute model has led to moral hazard and lax screening in the run-up to
the subprime crisis. Demyanyk and van Hemert (2008) argue that even though loan quality
in the U.S mortgage market deteriorated long before the crisis, securitizers were to some
extent aware of this.
2Our findings constitute a corroboration of the results by Loutskina and Strahan (2009)
in an international context. Our focus here is broader, though, in that we also look at the
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implications of securitization for consumption risk sharing. This aspect is absent from their
study.
3In the form in which we use them here they go back (at least) to Asdrubali et al. (1996)
and Sørensen and Yosha (1998). Crucini (1999) uses a very similar setup and also provides a
simple theoretical model in which the coefficient βU can directly be interpreted as the share
of claims to domestic output in the country’s wealth portfolio.
4Some papers in the empirical risk sharing literature use fixed and time effects, some do
not. Our results are not sensitive to this.
5Unfortunately the TIC data do not allow us to directly distinguish between securitized
mortgage debt and other securitized debt. However, mortgage debt very plausibly accounted
for the lion’s share of the international trade in securitized assets: of the 6911.4 billion dollar
in ABS outstanding in the US at the end of 2008, more than 5000 were mortgage-backed.
Data from the European Securitization Forum suggest that in Europe the share of mortgage-
backed securities in the total volume of outstanding ABS is of a similar magnitude.
6We obtain data on outstanding ABS from the FED’s Z1 Flow of Funds Accounts consid-
ering both private issuers as well as agency issued ABS backed by US collateral. We put this
number in relation to the US dollar amount outstanding of ABS backed by other countries’
collateral. The latter are obtained from the European Securitisation Forum Securitisation
Data Reports and are freely available on the website of the Association for Financial Markets
in Europe.
7We also constructed a de iure measure of securitization which allowed us to corroborate
some of our results on a longer sample. We do not report these results here because the
measure is very noisy and not conceptually comparable to our de facto measures here: it
only gauges the legal facility with which it is possible for a country to issue mortgage-backed
securities. It does not allow us to capture to which extent such assets are actually issued, let
alone traded across national borders. It is, however, the latter aspect that we would expect
to matter for international risk sharing. Details are available from a previous working paper
version (Hoffmann and Nitschka (2008)).
8Throughout the paper, we use standard errors clustered by country. This procedure
assumes errors to be uncorrelated across countries but allows each country to have different
(and unknown) forms of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity. Petersen (2009) advocates
clustering as a very efficient and robust way to estimate standard errors and shows that it
will lead to more conservative estimates than (panel-adjusted) versions of e.g. the Newey
and West (1987) method.
9Our empirical implementation of the risk sharing regression uses the United States as
stand-in for the rest of the world, i.e. idiosyncratic consumption and idiosyncratic GDP
growth are measured as ∆c˜kt = ∆c
k
t − ∆cUSt and ∆g˜dp
k
t = ∆gdp
k
t − ∆gdpUSt . This choice
would seem natural, since we only have bilateral cross-holdings of collateralized debt be-
tween the US and the other countries in our sample. We note that our results are not
sensitive to whether we use the US or the world average as measure of ∆c∗and ∆gdp∗.
10As is apparent from the figure and from Table 1, the variation in SECGAB and SECNAB
are in the order of magnitude of several tenths of one percent (ten basis points) of joint GDP.
These numbers are numerically small because they are expressed relative to the sum of
country k and U.S. GDP and because the U.S. economy is by far the biggest economy in the
sample. As the first part of Table 1 shows, from the point of view of the individual (non-U.S.)
economies, however, the bilateral gross and net holdings are economically quite sizeable.
In order to facilitate interpretation of our empirical specifications below, we normalize all
coefficients on SECNABand SECGAB by 1000 so that they reflect the marginal impact of
a ’typical’ change in these measures, i.e. in the order of magnitude of ten basis points.
11Specifically, de-meaning will also control for the importance of country-size differences,
provided these are invariant or at least very persistent. The findings here therefore suggests
that our results should be similar if we measure gross and net holdings of securitized debt
as a fraction of home (instead of joint) GDP. We checked that this is indeed the case. See
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Ozer-Balli and Sørensen (2010) for a succinct guide to the interpretation of time- and cross-
sectionally demeaned interactions.
12We emphasize that this does not preclude the possibility that increased domestic lending
may lead to better risk sharing between the households (and banks) within a country (see
Loutskina and Strahan (2009)).
13Again we emphasize that this does not preclude the possibility that domestic credit may
lead to unconditionally better risk sharing between the households (and banks) within a
country.
14See www.cje.economics.ca
15Note that all the results reported in the paper and in which net and gross holdings are
normalized by the sum of US and country GDP implicitly give higher weight to larger coun-
tries: our measures can be written as SECX,kt =
X
GDPkt +GDP
US
t
= X
GDPkt
× GDPkt
GDPkt +GDP
US
t
where X stands in turn for the gross and net position in terms of securitized assets. We be-
lieve that this weighting is reasonable: the estimated coefficient on the interaction between
SEC and idiosyncratic GDP growth tells us by how much securitization lowers the sensitiv-
ity of per capita consumption growth (relative to the US per capita average) to idiosyncratic
output shocks for the average consumer in one of the countries’ in our sample. Clearly, in
answering this question, it makes sense to weight with country size.
16To control somewhat for the feedback that the crisis had on the valuation of securitized
debt, this specification uses lagged values of SEC. Note that the coefficients on securitiza-
tion remain stable if we use lagged SEC in our panel-based specifications above.
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Table 2: Securitization and international risk sharing
The first column (I) of the table displays the estimates from our baseline risk sharing
regression:
∆c˜kt = β0∆g˜dp
k
t + β1SEC
X,k
t ×∆g˜dp
k
t + γ1SEC
X,k
t + α+ δ
k + τt + ε
k
t
where ∆c˜kt denotes idiosyncratic consumption growth, ∆g˜dp
k
t idiosyncratic GDP
growth and SECX,kt is one of our securitization measures X = GAB,NAB. Col-
umn (II) presents results of a specification that also includes a time fixed effect
in the interaction with ∆g˜dp
k
t (i.e. a set of regressors 1t × ∆g˜dp
k
t for t = 1...T
where 1t is the time effect dummy that is unity for period t and zeros otherwise)
whereas column (III) presents the results for the case in which the country-k mean
of SECX,kt is removed.
Robust t-statistics (clustered by country) are in parentheses below the estimates.
Coefficients on SECGABand SECNABare normalized by 1000 in order to re-
flect the marginal impact of a typical, i.e. ten basis point change in SECGABor
SECNAB .
Baseline regression:
∆c˜kt = β0∆g˜dp
k
t + β1SEC
X,k
t ×∆g˜dp
k
t + γ1SEC
X,k
t + α+ δ
k + τt + ε
k
t
A: Gross holdings (SECGAB), 2003-08
Baseline time fixed effects SECkt − SECk
interacted with ∆g˜dp
k
t
I II III
β0 0.76
(6.88)
0.90
(5.22)
0.52
(6.92)
β1 -0.11
(-2.10)
-0.09
(-2.05)
-0.16
(-2.03)
B: Net holdings (SECNAB), 2003-08
I II III
β0 0.74
(7.16)
0.90
(4.39)
0.53
(7.18)
β1 -0.13
(-3.14)
-0.11
(-3.05)
-0.25
(-3.47)
Table 3: Financial integration and securitization
This table presents estimates from the regression
∆c˜kt = β0∆g˜dp
k
t + z
k′
t βz∆g˜dp
k
t + y
k′
t γ + α+ δ
k + τt + ε
k
t
with the parameterization
zk′t βz = β1SEC
X,k
t + β2gfa
k
t
and where ykt stacks those elements of z
k′
t that vary across both time and
country, gfakt =
(FAkt+FL
k
t )
GDPkt
with FAkt foreign assets and FL
k
t foreign liabili-
ties of country k at time t. Robust t-statistics (clustered by country) appear in
parentheses below the estimates. X = GAB,NAB stands for the various se-
curitization measures. Coefficients on SECGABand SECNABare normalized
by 1000 in order to reflect the marginal impact of a typical, i.e. ten basis point
change in SECGABor SECNAB . Data on foreign assets and liabilities are from
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) and run till 2007. Since the regressions cover
the period 2003-08, gfakt for 2008 has been extrapolated from a 4th-order
polynomial previously fitted to the data.
interaction of ∆g˜dp
k
t with
1 SECX,kt gfa
k
t
(β0) (β1) (β2)
A: Gross holdings: (SECGAB, 2003-2008)
0.66
(4.26)
-0.12
(-2.78)
0.02
(1.02)
B: Net holdings: (SECNAB, 2003-2008)
0.60
(4.00)
-0.15
(-5.94)
0.03
(1.62)
Table 4: Risk sharing, securitization and credit
The table presents regressions of the form
∆c˜kt = β0∆g˜dp
k
t + z
k′
t βz∆g˜dp
k
t + y
k′
t γ + α+ δ
k + τt + ε
k
t
where zk′t βz = β1
(
credit
GDP
)k
t
+ β2SEC
X,k
t + β3
(
credit
GDP
)k
t
×SECX,kt + β4t and where ykt
stacks those elements of zk′t that vary across both time and country. The sample
period is 2003-2008. Robust t-statistics (clustered by country) appear in parentheses.
Coefficients on SECGABand SECNABare normalized by 1000 in order to reflect the
marginal impact of a typical, i.e. ten basis point change in SECGABor SECNAB .
Trend coefficient (β4) not reported.
interaction of ∆g˜dp
k
t with
1
[
credit
GDP
]k
t
SECX,kt
[
credit
GDP
]k
t
× SECX,kt
(β0) (β1) (β2) (β3)
A: Credit alone
0.08
(0.23)
0.31
(1.27)
B: Credit and Gross holdings: (SECGAB, 2003-08)
1.15
(7.19)
0.52
(2.96)
-0.12
(-2.48)
1.20
(4.87)
0.84
(3.10)
-0.19
(-2.77)
-0.18
(-1.91)
C: Credit and Net holdings: (SECNAB, 2003-08)
1.14
(7.45)
0.55
(3.05)
-0.15
(-3.11)
1.22
(6.11)
0.83
(4.58)
-0.24
(-5.39)
-0.18
(-3.45)
Gross holdings (SECGAB, 2003-08)
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1
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Figure 1: The figure shows the cross-country averages of the securitization
indicator, SECGAB,kt that is based on cross-border gross holdings of ABS (as
percent of joint (US and home) GDP×10).
2005 2006 2007 2008
−0.6
−0.5
−0.4
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Figure 2: Marginal impact of securitization on international risk sharing
2005-08. The red bars indicate the marginal effect on the conditional
volatility of country-specific consumption growth in the respective year, i.e.
the coefficient β1(t) in ∆c˜kt = β0(t)∆g˜dp
k
t + β1(t) × SECGAB,kt−1 × ∆g˜dp
k
t +
τt + ε
k
t . The blue (dashed) lines indicate the 95% confidence intervals.
